Intersectionality and Feminist Politics by Yuval-Davis, Nira
www.ssoar.info
Intersectionality and Feminist Politics
Yuval-Davis, Nira
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Yuval-Davis, N. (2006). Intersectionality and Feminist Politics. European Journal of Women's Studies, 13(3), 193-209.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1350506806065752
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-225117
Intersectionality and
Feminist Politics
Nira Yuval-Davis
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON
ABSTRACT This article explores various analytical issues involved in conceptual-
izing the interrelationships of gender, class, race and ethnicity and other social
divisions. It compares the debate on these issues that took place in Britain in the
1980s and around the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism. It examines
issues such as the relative helpfulness of additive or mutually constitutive models
of intersectional social divisions; the different analytical levels at which social
divisions need to be studied, their ontological base and their relations to each
other. The final section of the article attempts critically to assess a specific inter-
sectional methodological approach for engaging in aid and human rights work in
the South.
KEY WORDS identity politics ◆ intersectionality ◆ social divisions ◆ social
positionings
In the introduction to her book Ain’t I a Woman, bell hooks (1981) poured
scorn on the then common analogue many feminists used between the
situation of women and the situation of Blacks. ‘This implies’, she argued,
‘that all women are White and all Blacks are men.’ That was one of the
starting points of an analytical and political move by Black and other
feminists and social scientists to deconstruct the categories of both
‘women’ and ‘Blacks’ and to develop an analysis of the intersectionality of
various social divisions, most often – but not exclusively – focusing on
gender, race and class (for a more detailed history see, for example, Brah
and Phoenix, 2004).
The term ‘intersectionality’ itself was introduced by Kimberlé
Crenshaw (1989), when she discussed issues of black women’s employ-
ment in the US. She was eventually invited to introduce the notion of
intersectionality before a special session on the subject in Geneva during
the preparatory session to the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR)
in September 2001 in Durban, South Africa. In her introduction to the
session of the Non Governmental Organizations’ (NGO) Forum in the
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WCAR in which the issue was discussed, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the
special rapporteur of the UN Secretariat on violence against women,
stated that the term ‘intersectionality’ had become tremendously popular
and was used in various UN and NGO forums. Indeed, on 23 April 2002,
at the 58th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the resolu-
tion on the human rights of women stated in its first paragraph that it:
. . . recognized the importance of examining the intersection of multiple
forms of discrimination, including their root causes from a gender perspec-
tive. (Resolution E/CN.4/2002/L.59)
In this article, I examine some of the analytical issues involved in the
interrelationships of gender, class, race and ethnicity and other social
divisions. The main body of the article examines some 1980s (particularly
British) debates and considers how these issues have been represented in
ideas about intersecting social divisions used for political, legal and policy
purposes, especially in forums discussing UN human rights’ discourse.
Towards the end of the article, I assess the attempt to develop a specific
intersectional methodological approach for engaging in aid and human
rights work in the South.
CONTEXTUALIZING FEMINISM: GENDER, ETHNIC AND
CLASS DIVISIONS
In a recent paper, Alison Woodward (2005) argues that discussions on
issues of diversity and intersectionality have ‘arrived’ in European
equality policies as a result of the influence of consultants and thinkers
from the US. This is significant since these issues have been debated by
European (especially – but not only – British) feminist scholars since the
end of the 1970s but, apparently, without noticeable effect on policy-
makers.
In 1983, Floya Anthias and I published an article in Feminist Review1
arguing against the notion of ‘triple oppression’ then prevalent among
British Black Feminists (in organizations such as the Organization of
Women of African and Asian Descent [OWAAD]; see Bryan et al., 1985).
That article also laid the foundations of the analytical framework that we
further developed in our book Racialized Boundaries (Anthias and Yuval-
Davis, 1992) and in our separate work since (e.g. Anthias, 1998, 2001, 2002;
Yuval-Davis, 1994, 1997, 2005, 2006).
As is shown later in this article, the issues raised by the 1983 paper are
no longer limited to the preoccupations of Black and other ethnic minority
feminists but continue, in some ways, to be at the heart of feminist
theory and practice. To the extent that the debate has not been lost in
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postmodernist discussions of ‘difference’ and has retained its original
political importance, the question of whether to interpret the intersection-
ality of social divisions as an additive or as a constitutive process is still
central. This debate can also be constructed as a debate between identity
politics and transversal politics2 (Cockburn and Hunter, 1999; Yuval-
Davis, 1994, 1997) or between the recognition and recognition/distri-
bution models of the politics of difference (Benhabib, 2002; Fraser, 1997).
However, as demonstrated throughout the article, what is at the heart of
the debate is conflation or separation of the different analytic levels in
which intersectionality is located, rather than just a debate on the relation-
ship of the divisions themselves.
Before turning to more recent developments, it is useful to sum up the
original debate. When it was first presented, the ‘triple oppression’ notion
was basically a claim that Black women suffer from three different
oppressions/disadvantages/discriminations/exploitations (the analyti-
cal difference between these terms is not clear in the original OWAAD
formulations). They suffer oppression as: Blacks, women and members of
the working class.
Our argument against the ‘triple oppression’ approach was that there is
no such thing as suffering from oppression ‘as Black’, ‘as a woman’, ‘as a
working-class person’. We argued that each social division has a different
ontological basis, which is irreducible to other social divisions (as is
elaborated later in the article). However, this does not make it less import-
ant to acknowledge that, in concrete experiences of oppression, being
oppressed, for example, as ‘a Black person’ is always constructed and
intermeshed in other social divisions (for example, gender, social class,
disability status, sexuality, age, nationality, immigration status, geogra-
phy, etc.). Any attempt to essentialize ‘Blackness’ or ‘womanhood’ or
‘working classness’ as specific forms of concrete oppression in additive
ways inevitably conflates narratives of identity politics with descriptions
of positionality as well as constructing identities within the terms of
specific political projects. Such narratives often reflect hegemonic
discourses of identity politics that render invisible experiences of the more
marginal members of that specific social category and construct an
homogenized ‘right way’ to be its member. Ironically, this was exactly the
reason black women and members of other marginalized groupings felt
the need for what is known today as an intersectional analysis, except that
in such identity politics constructions what takes place is actually frag-
mentation and multiplication of the wider categorical identities rather
than more dynamic, shifting and multiplex constructions of intersection-
ality. Sandra Harding (1991) recognized this. Following the critique by
Baca Zinn and Stanley (1986) of the ways in which White feminists dealt
with issues of race and ethnicity, she claimed:
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. . . the additive approaches to race issues could no more be contained
within the terrains one might have envisioned for them at the start than
could the ‘add women and stir’ approaches to gender issues. (Harding,
1991: 212)
However, 20 years later, while the picture is somewhat different, there
is still great confusion about these issues.
INTERSECTIONALITY IN CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSE
Although the use of the term intersectionality did not appear until later,
several discussion documents on intersectionality (such as that of the
Working Group on Women and Human Rights at the Center for Women’s
Global Leadership in Rutgers University and of the Women’s Inter-
national League for Peace and Freedom UK Section [www.wilpf.org] in
2001) point to the UN Beijing Platform for Action (1995) as including the
core elements of an intersectional approach. They call for governments:
. . . to intensify efforts to ensure equal enjoyment of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all women and girls who face multiple barriers to
their empowerment and advancement because of such factors as their race,
age, language, ethnicity, culture, religion or disability or because they are
indigenous people. (Center for Women’s Global Leadership, 2001)
The UN CERD Committee (2000) adopted General Recommendation 25
on the gender-related dimensions of racial discrimination, which recog-
nizes the need for sessional working methods to analyse the relationship
between gender and racial discrimination.
However, it was in the Expert Meeting on Gender and Racial Discrimi-
nation that took place in Zagreb in November 2000 as part of the prepara-
tory process to the UN WCAR conference that a more specific analysis
and a proposal for a specific methodology for intersectionality were
attempted.
The discussion on the methodological approach attempted in that
forum is presented later. However, the analytic attempts to explain inter-
sectionality in the reports that came out of this meeting are confusing. The
imagery of crossroads and traffic as developed by Crenshaw (2001)
occupies a central space:
Intersectionality is what occurs when a woman from a minority group . . .
tries to navigate the main crossing in the city. . . . The main highway is
‘racism road’. One cross street can be Colonialism, then Patriarchy Street. . . .
She has to deal not only with one form of oppression but with all forms,
those named as road signs, which link together to make a double, a triple,
multiple, a many layered blanket of oppression.3
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The additive nature of this image, however, is very different from the
one that appears in the Australian Human Rights and Equal Oppor-
tunities Commission Issue Paper 2001 that states that:
An intersectional approach asserts that aspects of identity are indivisible
and that speaking of race and gender in isolation from each other results in
concrete disadvantage. (Australian Human Rights and EOC, 2001: 2)
The emphasis on identity in this analysis is also different from the struc-
tural emphasis in the report of the Working Group on Women and Human
Rights of the Center for Women’s Global Leadership. According to them,
the:
Intersectional approach to analysing the disempowerment of marginalized
women attempts to capture the consequences of the interaction between
two or more forms of subordination. It addresses the manner in which
racism, patriarchy, class oppression and other discriminatory systems create
inequalities that structure the relative positions of women, races, ethnicities,
classes and the like. Moreover, intersectionality addresses the way the
specific acts and policies operate together to create further empowerment.
(Center for Women’s Global Leadership, 2001: 1)
And yet in the next paragraph, all these different levels of analysis are
conflated together and reduced to ‘identities’:
Racially subordinated women and other multiply burdened groups who are
located at these intersections by virtue of their specific identities must
negotiate the traffic that flows from these intersections in order to obtain the
resources for the normal activities of life. (Center for Women’s Global
Leadership, 2001: 1)
Identities are individual and collective narratives that answer the
question ‘who am/are I/we?’ In contemporary literature they are often
required to ‘perform’ analytical tasks beyond their abilities (Anthias, 2002;
Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Yuval-Davis, 1994, 1997). One of the problem-
atics of the additive intersectionality model is that it often remains on one
level of analysis, the experiential, and does not differentiate between
different levels. The most sophisticated version of this mode has been that
of Philomena Essed (1991, 2001). In introductory courses on intersection-
ality such as in the University of Washington Transformation Project,
studies by Essed and Crenshaw are identified as major influences on the
development of the intersectionality approach. Essed (1991) links inter-
sectionality to what she calls ‘gendered racism’. She claims that:
. . . racisms and genderisms are rooted in specific histories designating
separate as well as mutually interwoven formations of race, ethnicity and
gender. (Essed, 2001: 1)
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Unlike Essed, who focuses on incidents of ‘everyday racism’, Crenshaw
(1993) differentiates between structural and political intersectionality and
resists the conflation of the positional and the discursive. Structural inter-
sectionality pertains to:
. . . the ways in which the location of women of colour at the intersection of
race and gender makes our actual experience of domestic violence, rape and
remedial reform qualitatively different from that of white women.
(Crenshaw, 1993: 3)
Political intersectionality relates to the manner in which:
. . . both feminist and antiracist politics have functioned in tandem to
marginalize the issue of violence against women of colour. (Crenshaw,
1993: 3)
Other feminists who have been using intersectional analysis in a consti-
tutive way have generally been even more careful in separating different
levels of analysis (e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983, 1992). Social
divisions are about macro axes of social power but also involve actual,
concrete people. Social divisions have organizational, intersubjective,
experiential and representational forms, and this affects the ways we
theorize them as well as the ways in which we theorize the connections
between the different levels. In other words, they are expressed in specific
institutions and organizations, such as state laws and state agencies, trade
unions, voluntary organizations and the family. In addition, they involve
specific power and affective relationships between actual people, acting
informally and/or in their roles as agents of specific social institutions
and organizations.
Social divisions also exist in the ways people experience subjectively
their daily lives in terms of inclusion and exclusion, discrimination and
disadvantage, specific aspirations and specific identities. Importantly, this
includes not only what they think about themselves and their communi-
ties but also their attitudes and prejudices towards others. Finally, they
also exist at the level of representation, being expressed in images and
symbols, texts and ideologies, including those to do with legislation.
Avtar Brah (1996) presents a somewhat similar model of four different
levels of analysis for the participation of Asian women in the British
labour market.
Unlike Mary Maynard (1994), who suggests that the analytic differenti-
ation of social divisions pivots on a distinction between the material and
the representational, our earlier study (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983) had
warned against such a differentiation, on the grounds that each level of
analysis has both material and symbolic production and effects (for an
elaboration of this point see Anthias, 2001). Brah (1996) similarly warns
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against a binary divide between structure and culture since both are
constructed as relational processes and neither is privileged over the other.
DIFFERENT KINDS OF DIFFERENCE
Different social divisions, such as class, race and ethnicity, tend to have
certain parameters in common. They tend to be ‘naturalized’, to be seen
as resulting from biological destiny linked to differential genetic pools of
intelligence and personal characteristics (Cohen, 1988). This naturaliza-
tion operates similarly, if not even more so, in relation to gender and sexu-
ality, ability and age. What is important to emphasize here, however, is
that in different cultural traditions naturalizing narratives can be differ-
ent, and certain naturalized categories can be emphasized more than
others. For example, in some cultural traditions the elderly are considered
to be wise while in others the elderly can be constructed as in ‘second
childhood’. These naturalizing discourses can also be used as discourses
of resistance in which, for example, ‘black is beautiful’ and ‘women are
really the stronger sex’.
What is common to all these discourses of naturalization is that they
tend to homogenize social categories and to treat all who belong to a
particular social category as sharing equally the particular natural
attributes (positive or negative) specific to it. Categorical attributes are
often used for the construction of inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries
that differentiate between self and other, determining what is ‘normal’
and what is not, who is entitled to certain resources and who is not. In this
way the interlinking grids of differential positionings in terms of class,
race and ethnicity, gender and sexuality, ability, stage in the life cycle and
other social divisions, tend to create, in specific historical situations, hier-
archies of differential access to a variety of resources – economic, political
and cultural.
However, there is a need to differentiate carefully between different
kinds of difference. In her discussion of epistemology, Sandra Harding
(1997: 385) commented that in addition to differences relating to differen-
tial power positionings, there are also ‘“mere differences” – the cultural
differences that would shape different knowledge projects even where
there were no oppressive social relations between different cultures’. In
our article on the situated imagination (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis, 2002),
we pointed out that we need to add to the two dimensions Harding posits
a third, which is not necessarily implied in either of the other two: Alison
Assiter’s (1996) notion of ‘epistemic communities’, in which political
values, rather than location across power grids or cultural perspectives,
become the unifying factors and shape access to knowledge collectively
rather than individually.
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By incorporating these different kinds of differences into our analysis
we can avoid conflating positionings, identities and values. We can also
avoid attributing fixed identity groupings to the dynamic processes of
positionality and location on the one hand and the contested and shifting
political construction of categorical boundaries on the other (for further
elaboration of this point, see Yuval-Davis, 2006). This is a problem that, as
shown later, is only partially overcome in Fraser’s (1997) recognition/
redistribution model and Benhabib’s (2002) sponsoring of it.
THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF SOCIAL DIVISIONS
While all social divisions share some features and are concretely
constructed by/intermeshed with each other, it is important also to note
that they are not reducible to each other. We are not talking here only
about a unidimensional differentiation between the powerful and the
powerless, nor are some differentiations just a reflection of more profound
others. To be Black or a woman is not another way of being working class,
or even a particular type of working-class person. This is not to deny that
in a specific historical context – or even in most concrete historical situ-
ations – people are not scattered randomly along the different axes of
power of different social divisions. Often people who are positioned in a
specific location along one such axis also tend to concentrate in a specific
location of another one (e.g. the majority of Black people in contemporary
western countries would be found among the lower socioeconomic
classes and women would tend to be poorer than men). This is why
Nancy Fraser (1997) can assert that gender and race are what she calls
bivalent collectivities that cut across the redistribution and recognition
spectrum while class relates to the redistributive model and ‘despised
sexualities’ to the social and cultural recognition one. However, such
generalizations are historically specific, are not inherently valid in every
situation and are under continuous processes of contestation and change.
When people are excluded from specific jobs, like teaching or becoming a
bishop, as recently happened in the Anglican Church, because of their
sexualities, this concerns not only their social and cultural recognition but
also their economic position. What is important is to analyse how specific
positionings and (not necessarily corresponding) identities and political
values are constructed and interrelate and affect each other in particular
locations and contexts. Similarly important would be an examination of
the particular ways in which the different divisions are intermeshed. One
cannot assume the same effect or constellation each time and, hence, the
investigation of the specific social, political and economic processes
involved in each historical instance is important.
At the same time, it is important to remember that the ontological basis
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of each of these divisions is autonomous, and each prioritizes different
spheres of social relations (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983, 1992). For
example, class divisions are grounded in relation to the economic
processes of production and consumption; gender should be understood
not as a ‘real’ social difference between men and women, but as a mode of
discourse that relates to groups of subjects whose social roles are defined
by their sexual/biological difference while sexuality is yet another related
discourse, relating to constructions of the body, sexual pleasure and
sexual intercourse. Ethnic and racial divisions relate to discourses of
collectivities constructed around exclusionary/inclusionary boundaries
(Barth, 1969) that can be constructed as permeable and mutable to differ-
ent extents and that divide people into ‘us’ and ‘them’. Such boundaries
are often organized around myths (whether historically valid or not) of
common origin and/or common destiny. Constructions of the body,
religious and other cultural codes concerning marriage and divorce are
crucial in constructing those boundaries. ‘Ability’ or, rather, ‘disability’
involves even vaguer and more heterogeneous discourses than those
relating to ethnicity, as people can be ‘disabled’ in so many different ways.
However, they involve discourses of ‘normality’ from which all disabled
people are excluded. Age represents the dimension of time and the life
cycle and shows even more clearly than other social divisions how
categories and their boundaries are not fixed and how their social and
political meanings can vary in different historical contexts as well as being
continually challenged and restructured both individually and socially.
WHICH SOCIAL DIVISIONS?
One of the differences among the different approaches to intersectionality
that were portrayed in the earlier sections is that while some (especially
Essed, Crenshaw and Harding) focus on the particular positions of
women of colour, others (such as Brah, Maynard, Anthias and Yuval-
Davis) have been constructed in more general terms, applicable to any
grouping of people, advantaged as well as disadvantaged. This expands
the arena of intersectionality to a major analytical tool that challenges
hegemonic approaches to the study of stratification as well as reified
forms of identity politics.
One of the issues represented, implicitly or explicitly, in much of the
literature is how many social divisions are involved and/or which ones
should be incorporated into the analysis of the intersectionality process.
As mentioned earlier, among Black and other minority ethnic feminists,
whether or not they adhered to the model of ‘triple oppression’, race (or
race and ethnicity), gender and class are perceived to be the three major
social divisions. Other feminist theorists add other dimensions, such as
Yuval-Davis: Intersectionality and Feminist Politics 201
age (e.g. Bradley, 1996); disability (e.g. Meekosha and Dowse, 1997; Oliver,
1995); sedentarism (e.g. Lentin, 1999) or sexuality (e.g. Kitzinger, 1987).
One of the most comprehensive attempts to include additional axes of
social divisions is that of Helma Lutz – although in her formulation they
are not axes but rather ‘basic dualisms’; this is problematic and she herself
considers it a ‘challenge to consider the spaces in-between’ (Lutz, 2002:
13). Her list includes the following 14 ‘lines of difference’: gender; sexual-
ity; ‘race’/skin-colour; ethnicity; nation/state; class; culture; ability; age;
sedentariness/origin; wealth; North–South; religion; stage of social
development. Lutz, however, sees this list as ‘by no means complete;
other categories have to be added or re-defined’ (Lutz, 2002: 13). Indeed,
the list is potentially boundless. This is, no doubt, one of the reasons why
Crenshaw, when she presented her model of intersectionality at the
WCAR conference, produced a visual image of a person standing at a
road junction, vehicles coming at her from an indeterminate number of
cross-cutting roads.
Do we have to be concerned that the list is limitless? Judith Butler (1990)
mocks the ‘etc.’ that often appears at the end of lists of social divisions
mentioned by feminists (e.g. at the beginning of this article) and sees it as
an embarrassed admission of a ‘sign of exhaustion as well as of the
illimitable process of signification itself’ (Butler, 1990: 143). As Fraser
(1997) and Knapp (1999) make clear, such a critique is valid only within
the discourse of identity politics where there is a correspondence between
positionings and social groupings. This is the way additive/fragmenta-
tion models of social divisions operate. When no such conflation takes
place, Knapp finds rightly that Butler’s talk:
. . . ‘of an illimitable process of signification’ can be reductionist if it is gener-
alized in an unspecified way. An analytical perspective which, in a critical
or affirmative fashion, concentrates exclusively on the symbolic modes of
construction and representation of ‘difference’ (as identity) runs the risk of
levelling historically constituted ‘factual’ differences and thereby suppress-
ing ‘difference’ on its own terms. (Knapp, 1999: 130)
Knapp’s critique of Butler clarifies the crucial importance of the separ-
ation of the different analytical levels in which social divisions need to be
examined (discussed earlier). She calls for ‘theory formation and research
which accounts for the diverse conditions which gave rise to the consti-
tution of differences as well as their historical interconnectedness’
(Knapp, 1999: 130) – or, using the terminology presented here, the ways
different social divisions are constructed by, and intermeshed with, each
other in specific historical conditions.
There is an important question that needs to be made explicit, however,
although it will not necessarily be possible to answer it. Is the issue what
Butler calls ‘the illimitable process of signification itself’ or are there, in
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any particular historical condition, specific and limited numbers of social
divisions that construct the grid of power relations within which the
different members of the society are located? There are two different
answers to this question, which are not mutually exclusive. The first is
that in specific historical situations and in relation to specific people there
are some social divisions that are more important than others in construct-
ing specific positionings. At the same time, there are some social
divisions, such as gender, stage in the life cycle, ethnicity and class, that
tend to shape most people’s lives in most social locations, while other
social divisions such as those relating to membership in particular castes
or status as indigenous or refugee people tend to affect fewer people
globally. At the same time, for those who are affected by these and other
social divisions not mentioned here, such social divisions are crucial and
necessitate struggle to render them visible. This is, therefore, a case where
recognition – of social power axes, not of social identities – is of crucial
political importance.
The second answer relates to what Castoriadis (1987) called the
‘creative imagination’ (see also Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis, 2002) that
underlies linguistic and other social categories of signification. Although
certain social conditions may facilitate this, the construction of categories
of signification is, in the last instance, a product of human creative
freedom and autonomy. Without specific social agents who construct and
point to certain analytical and political features, the rest of us would not
be able to distinguish them. Rainbows include the whole spectrum of
different colours, but how many colours we distinguish depends on our
specific social and linguistic milieu. It is for this reason that struggles for
recognition always include an element of construction and that studying
the relationships between positionings, identities and political values is so
important (and impossible if they are all reduced to the same ontological
level).
INTERSECTIONALITY AS A HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
METHODOLOGY
Beyond ontological questions of how many social divisions there are and
whether we are dealing with axes of social divisions, dualistic lines of
difference or specific forms of discrimination, it is important to note that
there is often a conflation between vectors of discrimination and differ-
ence and identity groupings. In her presentation to the WCAR conference
on intersectionality, Charlotte Bunch described 16 vectors of difference
(from gender and class to indigenousness and rural living), and
concluded that ‘If the human rights of any are left unprotected – if we are
willing to sacrifice the rights of any group, the human rights of all are
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undermined’ (Center for Women’s Global Leadership, 2001: 111). This is
problematic both theoretically and politically, as it constructs difference
per se as automatic grounds for both discrimination and entitlement for
defence from discrimination. It does not attend to the differential position-
ings of power in which different identity groups can be located in specific
historical contexts, let alone the dynamics of power relations within these
groups. Nor does it give recognition to the potentially contested nature of
the boundaries of these identity groupings and the possibly contested
political claims for representation of people located in the same social
positionings. These problematics have also affected attempts to construct
a methodological approach to intersectionality in development and
human rights fieldwork as pursued by Bunch’s Center for Women’s
Global Leadership and presented to the WCAR conference.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INTERSECTIONAL
POLICY
Intersectional analysis has been introduced to human rights discourse as
part of gender mainstreaming, for ‘the full diversity of women’s experi-
ences’ to be considered, and in order ‘to enhance women’s empowerment’
(Center for Women’s Global Leadership, 2001). As the background
briefing paper on intersectionality of the Working Group on Women and
Human Rights of the Center for Women’s Global Leadership claims,
‘developing of new and augmenting of existing methodologies to uncover
the ways multiple identities converge to create and exacerbate women’s
subordination’ is critical.
These methodologies will not only underline the significance of the inter-
section of race, ethnicity, caste, citizenship status for marginalized women
etc but serve to highlight the full diversity of women’s experiences. (Center
for Women’s Global Leadership, 2001: 1)
The methodology suggested by the working group has four distinct
components:
• Data collection, which depends on the availability of desegregated
data of various social, legal and identity categories of women. The
need for desegregated data was highlighted during the WCAR
conference in several forums, including by Mary Robinson, the then
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who organized the
WCAR conference.
• Contextual analysis, which would probe ‘beneath the single identity
to discover other identities that may be present and contribute to the
situation of disadvantage’.
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• Intersectional review of policy initiatives and systems of implemen-
tation in terms of their efficacy in addressing the problems faced by
different intersectional identities.
• Implementation of intersectional policy initiatives based on the
above.
This policy methodology seems impressive and a step forward. However,
it also raises difficult and complex empirical as well as analytical ques-
tions. The construction of categories of desegregated data would, by defi-
nition be unambiguous and mutually exclusive, in contrast to the
situation generally found in the field. Yet, as Ashish Nandi (1983) points
out, even an apparently simple category of ascription as membership in a
religious community is often ambiguous and multiplex, as people in
many parts of the world may associate with more than one religion at the
same time and/or worship in completely different ways and along differ-
ent lines of religious authority under the same nominal religion. Benedict
Anderson (1991) has identified the devastating effects the introduction of
mutually exclusive census categories has had on colonial societies in
which peaceful coexistence of communities often depended on categori-
cal opaqueness. In addition, there is no differentiation between categories
of positionality and social identities. This could render invisible the
crucially important political struggles being carried out in many parts of
the world that problematize and contest the boundaries of social collectiv-
ities. Such boundaries are naturalized by specific hegemonic political
projects in order to exclude and marginalize certain people. The point of
intersectional analysis is not to find ‘several identities under one’ – as the
methodology described earlier suggests. This would reinscribe the frag-
mented, additive model of oppression and essentialize specific social
identities. Instead, the point is to analyse the differential ways in which
different social divisions are concretely enmeshed and constructed by
each other and how they relate to political and subjective constructions of
identities.
This means that field methodology should carefully separate, and
examine separately, the different levels in which social divisions operate
in the communities where they work and which were discussed earlier,
i.e. institutionally, intersubjectively, representationally as well as in the
subjective constructions of identities. Only when such a contextual
analysis is carried out can there be an intersectional review of policy
initiatives and systems of implementation. Such a review should involve,
in addition to the policy-makers, as many people on the ground as
possible. The differential positionings and perspectives of the participants
in such a dialogue should be acknowledged without treating them as
representatives of any fixed social grouping. As in similar feminist
dialogues that Italian and other feminists have termed ‘transversal’
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(Cockburn and Hunter, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 1994, 1997), the boundaries of
the dialogue should be determined by common political emancipatory
goals while the tactical and strategic priorities should be led by those
whose needs are judged by the participants of the dialogue to be the most
urgent.
CONCLUSION
Intersectional analysis of social divisions has come to occupy central
spaces in both sociological and other analyses of stratification as well as in
feminist and other legal, political and policy discourses of international
human rights. There has been a gradual recognition of the inadequacy of
analysing various social divisions, but especially race and gender, as
separate, internally homogeneous, social categories resulting in the
marginalization of the specific effects of these, especially on women of
colour.
However, the analysis and the methodology of intersectionality, especi-
ally in UN-related bodies is just emerging and often suffers from analyti-
cal confusions that have already been tackled by feminist scholars who
have been working on these issues for longer, outside the specific global
feminist networks that developed around the Beijing Forum. Wider
dialogue and articulation of problems would be useful to both feminist
scholars and global feminist networks.
NOTES
The first draft of this article was presented in May 2002 in Copenhagen at a
meeting of the European Women’s Network on Intersectionality. Thanks to the
organizers and participants for their helpful feedback.
1. Reprinted also in Lovell (1990).
2. Transversal politics is a democratic practice of alliances across boundaries
of difference (see Yuval-Davis, 1997).
3. Report of the WCAR meeting as presented by Indira Patel to a day seminar
in London organized by WILPF UK, November 2001.
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